


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# ISSUES OF A NEW EPOCH

## *The* Coal Strike Panama Philippines and Cuba

BY

Joseph Bucklin Bishop

Author of "Our Political Drama," "Cheap Money  
Experiments," Etc.

Reprinted from

"The International Quarterly"

NEW YORK  
SCOTT-THAW COMPANY

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Class

Book











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# ISSUES OF A NEW EPOCH.

## THE COAL STRIKE.

THE anthracite coal strike which was ended through the intervention of the President in October, 1902, was not only the most serious contest of the kind this country has ever known, but the most serious that the world has known. Other strikes have involved a larger number of men and have entailed nearly or quite as much financial loss, but none has affected the people of the entire country to anything like the extent which this one did, simply because none stopped the production of what has come to be regarded as a necessity of life. Of course anthracite is not an absolute necessity of life. If the supply were to be exhausted this year, substitutes for it as fuel would be found. The world would have to learn to get on without it; but so long as people regard it as a necessity, and so long as they know it exists and can be obtained, they will not submit to having the supply cut off without protest, more or less violent, according to their needs and sufferings. That virtually all the people did believe in October, 1902, that anthracite was a necessity both to their comfort and their health, is not to be questioned. They believed it so implicitly that nothing which could be said to the contrary had any appreciable effect upon them. Their conviction was so strong that the mere threat of a coal famine sent a panicky feeling throughout every large city in the land. In the country districts a sufficient supply of wood could be obtained, but in the cities there was little or no hope of doing so. Bituminous coal was an insufficient substitute because nearly all existing heating apparatus was not adapted to its use. Without anthracite, every household in a large city was threatened with discomfort and peril. It came about, therefore, that the whole population had an intense personal interest in the strike based upon two very strong reasons—first, danger to their individual

well-being; and, second, a heavy tax upon their resources to meet the higher cost of fuel of any kind.

As weeks and months went by with one promise of settlement after another proving a delusion, and with cold weather at hand, this panicky feeling increased until it became a menace to the public safety. For five months the mines had been idle, and while the coal operators declared that there was no danger of a coal famine, it was within the knowledge of every householder that the famine was already in sight. It was only with extreme difficulty that a single ton of coal could be obtained in New York and other large cities by a small consumer, and every householder who had neglected to put in his winter's supply in the spring found it impossible to obtain it except in small quantities and at steadily rising prices. Many dealers refused to take orders and most of them were entirely without a supply. In the presence of a condition like this it was worse than foolish for the mine owners to persist in their statement, as they did daily, that there was no scarcity, for their denial of what everybody knew to be the actual fact served to arouse popular distrust of them and to aggravate rather than to quiet the general uneasiness. It was almost maddening to tell thousands of people who had been trying in vain for days and weeks to get coal that there was plenty of coal to be had and they were foolish to think there was not.

When all efforts to bring about a settlement had failed, when the state of Pennsylvania had shown itself powerless to even maintain order in the coal region, it was natural for the people of the country to turn to the Federal government for aid. This they began to do early in October, when the approach of cold weather sent a thrill of alarm through the land. Appeals to President Roosevelt began to pour in from all quarters, both from individuals and from persons in authority. Governor Crane of Massachusetts, Mayor Low of New York City, and the heads of municipal governments generally besought the President to use his good offices in some way to bring about an adjustment in order that the imminent peril of starving and riot might be averted from the land. The President could not be deaf to such appeals. No president that the country has ever had could have been, for not only the comfort and lives of countless numbers of people were threatened, but stability and lawful government, and millions in property were at stake in every city of the land. The President had no authority in law and no precedent to sustain him. He was fully aware of this and he succeeded by never losing sight of the fact that he had neither. No task that he had

undertaken previously had involved so large an element of political risk as this did. It was an entirely new departure. Nothing like it had ever been done by a president. The great body of conservative opinion in the country had serious doubts about either the wisdom or the justification of the step. He felt moved to act because of the great public need and great public peril involved, and he could not escape the conviction that it was a matter of simple duty for him, as the people's president, to exert all the moral influence he had in the interest of the people. Criticism did not affect him at all, no matter what its source, once he had made up his mind. He did not count the chances of success or failure, and when he was told, as he was repeatedly, that failure would ruin him politically, he went steadily and fearlessly ahead. While both sides to the quarrel repulsed his first efforts and refused to step up to the high ground of public welfare upon which he stood and to which he invited them, he persevered in his appeals to them till both came in the end, if not willingly, at least with recognition of the fact that he had offered to them a way out without surrender. He succeeded in this, as he succeeded in all other like endeavors, by being open and straightforward in all his proceedings. He had no hidden end to reach; he leaned neither to one side nor to the other, but said simply, "I offer you my services as mediator in order that this contest which so seriously threatens the welfare and the peace of the whole country may be brought to an end." His obvious sincerity and singleness of purpose so impressed the whole country and, indeed, the whole world, that the contending forces were fairly compelled to yield to his proposals. The chorus of praise which arose from all quarters of the land, and from all the leading countries of Europe, when success was recorded, was something that no other president had received. He himself was unable to comprehend it and thought it undeserved. When it was spoken of in his presence, he said to his intimate friends, "I am being very much over-praised by everybody. I do not deserve it. It really seems to me that any man of average courage and common sense, who felt as deeply as I did the terrible calamity impending over our people, would have done just what I did."

He was not the only person in the land who felt the gravity of the situation. It has been charged and is still charged by his critics that he did what no other president before him had done and what few of them would have consented to do. It is no longer a secret that in all that he did he had the hearty approval and

sympathy of ex-President Cleveland. Early in his efforts to bring about peace between the mine operators and the miners, Mr. Cleveland took occasion to express his complete accord with him. On the day following the first meeting before the President, at Washington, of the operators and representatives of the strikers, which failed because of the refusal of the operators to consent to a commission of arbitration, Mr. Cleveland wrote to the President a letter which in addition to expressing approval of the President's course, and some righteous indignation at the obstinacy of the contestants, contained suggestions for a plan of settlement, and gave as a reason for volunteering his views that his doing so would at least "serve as an indication of the anxiety felt by millions of our citizens on the subject." The only living ex-President, and the only Democratic President that the country has had since the civil war, thus joined hands with the Republican President in believing that a crisis had arisen which was so grave as to justify extraordinary action by the Executive of the nation. It is also no longer a secret, that after receiving this letter from Mr. Cleveland, President Roosevelt asked him if he would consent to be a member of a commission of settlement and that Mr. Cleveland replied in the affirmative. This acceptance pleased the President to appoint a commission without the consent of the operators, in case they continued in their refusal to give it, and he proceeded to choose the members of it, with Mr. Cleveland as the first. The men whom he selected were mainly those sincerely appointed, but when the operators and their managers first heard of the President's purpose and heard also of Mr. Cleveland's selection as member of the commission, they immediately gave their consent to the plan of arbitration, but protested vigorously against the selection of Mr. Cleveland. They realized keenly enough what the moral effect would be upon the country of having it appear that the only living ex-President, who was also the most eminent Democrat in the land, stood shoulder to shoulder with President Roosevelt in what he had done and proposed to do. That would have ended the "Constitutional" objection to Roosevelt's course at once and forever.

But if the operators would not permit Mr. Cleveland to serve on the commission, they did allow the President to appoint to it a Democrat who indisputably ranks next to Mr. Cleveland in ability and character, and in reputation for sound Constitutional construction, when they consented to the choice of Judge George Gray of Delaware. His approval of the President's course, ex-

pressed after he had conducted the inquiry to a successful conclusion, should be a sufficient answer to the criticisms which are made of the President's course. In an interview which was published in the New York "World," on September 1, 1903, Judge Gray said:

"I have no hesitation in saying that the President of the United States was confronted in October, 1902, by the existence of a crisis more grave and threatening than any that had occurred since the civil war. I mean that the cessation of mining in the anthracite country, brought about by the dispute between the miners and those who controlled the greatest natural monopoly in this country and perhaps in the world, had brought upon more than one half of the American people a condition of deprivation of one of the necessities of life, and the probable continuance of the dispute threatened not only the comfort and health, but the safety and good order, of the nation. He was without legal or constitutional power to interfere, but his position as President of the United States gave him an influence, a leadership, as first citizen of the republic, that enabled him to appeal to the patriotism and good sense of the parties to the controversy and to place upon them the need of the opinion of public opinion to agree to an arbitrament of the strike, to an existing and threatening consequences so direful to the whole country. He acted promptly and courageously, and in so doing averted the dangers to which I have alluded."

"So far from interfering or interfering upon property rights, the President's action tended to conserve them. The peculiar situation, as regards the anthracite coal interest, was that they controlled a natural monopoly of a product necessary to the comfort and to the very life of a large portion of the people. A prolonged deprivation of the enjoyment of this necessary of life would have tended to precipitate an attack upon these property rights of which you speak, for after all it is vain to deny that this property, so peculiar in its conditions and which is properly spoken of as a natural monopoly, is affected with a public interest."

"I do not think that any president ever acted more wisely, courageously or promptly in national crisis. Mr. Roosevelt deserves unstinted praise for what he did."

It has always been contended by the President's critics that if he had not intervened the strikers would have surrendered in a very short time. Those who make this assertion overlook, in the first place, the fact that the operators had been for fully two months predicting daily the end of the strike. They overlook, in the second place, the fact that under the Pennsylvania law the entire body of available mine workers was with the strikers.

It was claimed by the mine operators that only about one-fifth of the laborers in the coal region were members of the organization which, under Mr. Mitchell's leadership, ordered the strike; that the other half were either members of local unions or non-union men. The highest estimate which the operators made of the number of persons whom they were able to induce

to work while the strike was in progress was 17,000. Under the Pennsylvania law, no person can be employed as a miner in the anthracite mines until he has passed an examination by a state board created for the purpose and has received a certificate or license. One of the conditions of such license is "not less than two years' practical experience as a mine laborer" in the anthracite fields. It was this requirement which most seriously handicapped the operators in their efforts to work the mines without the aid of the strikers, for men brought from other sections could be employed only in violation of the law. The strikers claimed that they controlled ninety-five per cent. of all the licensed workers, and this was probably true. While the commission was in session I asked one of the regular counsel of the operators if it was not true that, if the operators had been given ample military protection to prevent all intimidation and violence on the part of the strikers against the non-union men who were willing to work, they would still have been unable, because of the license law, to obtain a force of miners sufficient to produce a supply of coal anything like adequate to the country's demand. He replied that it was true. That was an admission that Mr. Holt was master of the situation, and that unless the President had intervened there would have been no prospect of coal, a scarcity so serious as to cause suffering and panic in the large cities.

One of the most interesting aspects of the President's commission for final adjustment of the questions at issue between the operators and their employees was the principle of arbitration embodied in it. This was a very different principle from the one thus far applied by Mr. Mitchell at the outset of the struggle. It would be remembered that the Chief Executive, under the leadership of Senator Hanna, had at an early and prolonged effort to settle the strike when it was first threatened in April. A conference between the conflicting parties was held, and although an armistice of thirty days was secured, failure occurred because the operators refused to recognize the authority coming to an arbitration with them. In an arbitration of that kind the claims of non-union men would have no standing whatever, for there would simply be two parties to it, the operators and the union. Under the President's plan the commission was to consider "all questions at issue between the respective companies and their employees," and it was especially stipulated that pending its findings all miners should return to work and all interference with and persecution of non-union men at present working



or hereafter employed should cease. It was also stipulated, and the stipulation was accepted by both parties, that when the commission should have reached its finding these "shall govern the conditions of employment between the respective companies and their employees for a term of at least three years."

The selections which the President made for members of the commission were in accordance with the spirit of his appeal. He chose them with the single object in view of getting a decision in accordance with right and justice. It was the unanimous opinion of the country that a more competent or more impartial tribunal could not have been constituted. It was in every way superior to the Civic Federation as an arbitrating body, for it contained no one who was identified directly with either party to the controversy. The Civic Federation was, furthermore, a self-constituted body and could only offer its services in such controversies. It was not asked to arbitrate the coal strike, and it could not get the consent of the operators to such arbitration. The President's commission entered upon its duties under the highest civil authority, and under, of the highest officer in the land, and with the consent of both the contestants and their promise to accept its decision. It was, after nearly five months, taking a great mass of testimony and agreeing unanimously upon a report that was a compromise, in which the strikers secured about half their demands, and the operators got a cheating upon their main contention, which was to recognize their union by the mine operators. The use of intimidation and violence in support of the strike was totally prohibited, and for the settlement of future disputes a board of conciliation was proposed, to be made up of three laborers, three each side, who could appeal to the circuit judge of the district to appoint an umpire whose decision should be final. The report was generally regarded as equitable, and was cheerfully accepted as they had pledged themselves in advance to do. Since the verdict was rendered there has been peace in the coal region. From time to time minor disputes have arisen but they have been settled easily under the terms of the agreement. The great results of the President's course were, therefore, an immediate resumption of mining, which supplied the country with coal and thus warded off suffering and disorder, and the establishment of peace in the region for three years. The indirect but scarcely less beneficent result was the beginning of a better understanding between operators and miners which every day of peace is developing and strengthening.

## PANAMA REPUBLIC AND CANAL COURSE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.

THE future historian, when he sits down to write the narrative of the establishment of the republic of Panama, will treat it as the culminating step in a movement that had been in progress for more than four hundred years. Viewed in that perspective, it is likely to appear a far less hasty proceeding than it seemed to be at the time it was effected. The final step was swift only when contemplated by itself. Considered in connection with the long and wearisome and annoying journey which had preceded it, the wonder is not that it was taken so quickly, but that human patience had delayed so long before taking it.

I shall endeavor, in making a record of it, to treat it as completely as possible in the light of history, for it has become historical fact. The new republic is established with the recognition of the United States and all the leading nations of the world, and the treaty by which the United States guarantees and pledges itself to maintain the independence of the republic of Panama was ratified in the Senate by a vote of sixty-six to fourteen, so many Democrats voting in it as to make approval of the Roosevelt administration's course virtually non-partisan, and hence popular. Instead of arguing the case for the government, I shall content myself with a statement of its reasons for the action which it took, citing these as its answer to the main points of the criticism which has been made against its course.

Did the Roosevelt administration act too quickly in recognizing the new republic?

In considering this question, both the President and the Secretary of State, according to their official explanations of their course, recalled the long history of the efforts of the American government to pierce the Isthmus with a canal. As early as 1528 a proposal was laid before the Emperor Charles V. for the opening of such a way across the Isthmus of Panama. From that day till 1904 the project continued to occupy a place among

the great enterprises yet to be accomplished. It remained unfilled only because the experience of four hundred years had demonstrated that private effort was wholly inadequate to the purpose, and that the work must be performed, if at all, under the auspices of a government of the largest resources. There was only one such government in a position to undertake it. By a well settled policy, in which all American nations are understood to concur, the assumption of the task by any of the great governments of Europe was pronounced to be inadmissible. Among American governments there was only one that seemed to be able to assume the burden and that was the government of the United States. To the accomplishment of this object that government had for years directed its diplomacy. It occupied a place in the instructions to our delegates to the Panama Congress during the administration of John Quincy Adams. It formed the subject of a resolution of the Senate in 1835, and of the House of Representatives in 1839. In 1846 its importance had become still more apparent by reason of the Mexican War, when a treaty was made with New Granada in regard to it. Four years later the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was entered into between this country and Great Britain. That treaty instead of furthering the project proved to be an insuperable bar to it. During the fifty-one years of its existence, nothing was done toward the construction of a canal. It became, almost immediately after ratification, the subject of bitter attack in this country because of its violation of the Monroe Doctrine, in allowing England and other European nations to share with us control of a canal, and because of England's alleged failure to comply with its conditions. From time to time, efforts were made to have the treaty denounced, or declared by us void because of England's failure to comply with its requirements, but the American government refused steadily to take this view, holding that we were bound in honor to abide by the treaty till England should consent to its abrogation. That consent was given, and in December, 1901, a new treaty was agreed upon, the main point of which is the complete withdrawal of Great Britain from partnership with the United States in the control of any canal that may be constructed. It was to be built with American money, and controlled by Americans, and its neutrality maintained by Americans. The United States secured power "to maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder," but beyond that no express power is given to fortify it, while the language of the treaty

seems to amount to a prohibition in that direction. "The canal," it reads, "shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing the rules prescribed for the preservation of its neutrality, and shall never be blocked, nor shall any right of war be exercised, nor any act of hostility be committed within it."

The way now seemed clear for the construction of the canal. On January 22, 1902, the second Pan-American Conference, sitting at the City of Mexico, adopted the following resolution:

"The Republics assembled at the International Conference of Mexico applied the purpose of the United States government to construct an inter-oceanic canal, and acknowledge that this work will not only be worthy of the greatness of the American people, but also in the highest sense a work of civilization and to the greatest degree beneficial to the development of commerce between the American States and the other countries of the world."

Among the delegates who signed this resolution, which was adopted without dissent, was the delegate of Colombia. The next step was the decision of the United States in favor of the Panama route in preference to that of Nicaragua, and the passage of the Spooner Act of June, 1902, authorizing the President to acquire in any manner not exceeding \$40,000,000 the property and concessions of the Panama Canal Company and to obtain from Colombia such territory as he deemed reasonable, control of the territory to be ceded to be retained. Thereafter negotiations were opened with Colombia, and on January, 1903, the Hay-Herrn Treaty was agreed upon. This was created by the Senate and was sent to Congress for approval by the government. While the treaty was being negotiated between the representatives of the United States and Colombia, negotiation was made by the Colombian government through its representatives to the first article, which provided: "The government of Colombia authorizes the new Panama Canal Company to sell and to transfer to the United States its rights, privileges, property and concessions, as well as the Panama railroad and all the shares or part of the shares of that company." The Colombian government asked to have this modified so as to read that the privileges accorded by Colombia in regard to canal and railway rights should "be regulated by previous special arrangement entered into by Colombia." This request the American government refused to grant, and it was abandoned by Colombia, whose representatives signed the treaty with the full authorization as it stands in the article, which is identical with that in the original draft of a treaty pre-

sented by Colombia itself through its minister to the American government in March, 1902. Some time after the treaty had been signed, the American government was surprised to learn that the Colombian government, in violation of this article, had sent notices to the canal company saying that further permission, in addition to that contained in the treaty, was necessary for the transfer of its concession and those of the railway company to the United States, and requiring the companies to cancel all obligations of Colombia to them, and thus destroy the rights, privileges, and concessions which Colombia by the treaty solemnly authorized the canal company to sell to the United States. That, if successful, would of course destroy the treaty by defeating its main purpose. This was one of many similar attacks, all instigated by the Colombian government, against the treaty which its representatives had signed, conduct which, as Secretary Hay has pointed out, is in violation of the familiar rule that "two governments, in agreeing to a treaty through their duly authorized representatives, bind themselves, pending its ratification, not only not to oppose its consummation, but also to do nothing in contravention of its terms." The attack which is believed to have been the main cause of the rejection of the treaty by the Colombian Congress was made in a report to the Colombian Senate by its canal committee, in which it was held that at the end of a year all the concessions granted by the government to the Panama Canal Company would lapse, and that then Colombia could take for itself the forty million dollars which the United States had agreed to pay the Panama Canal Company. After this the treaty was rejected and the congress adjourned.

### WHY THE PRESIDENT WAS PROMPT.

It is the contention of the American government that Colombia's course in regard to the treaty showed conclusively the hopelessness of ever getting a satisfactory agreement from her. That was the conclusion of the people of Panama, for they made up their minds that in case the treaty was rejected they would revolt, and they made elaborate preparations, months in advance to do so, fully anticipating rejection.

This was the situation when the revolution took place on November 3, 1903. President Roosevelt had become so thoroughly convinced, when the treaty was rejected, that further efforts to reach agreement with Colombia on fair and equitable terms would be useless, that his intention was, he said in a sub-

sequent message, "to consult the congress as to whether under such circumstances it would not be proper to announce that the canal was to be dug forthwith; that we would give the terms that we had offered and no others; and that if such terms were not agreed to we would enter into an arrangement with Panama direct, or take what other steps were needed in order to begin the enterprise." In taking this position, he was acting in accordance with a sentiment expressed by Secretary Cass, in 1858, in the following official statement of the American government's attitude:

"While the rights of sovereignty of the states occupying this region Central America should always be respected, we still expect that those rights be exercised in a spirit benevolent to the cause, and the wants and circumstances that have arisen. Sovereign states, as well as individuals, and none of those who are guilty of crimes, can be mastered with more regard to the just demands of the nations than they have been. would be permitted to export foreign slaves, to use the ports of intercourse in the great highways of the world, and justify the act by the pretension that these vessels are to be used for legitimate trade, and that they choose to sail under whatever flag they may wish, and to make them with such just restraints as would prevent their general use."

Forty years have passed since that opinion was expressed, and during that time the progress has been made toward beginning the construction of the canal. The day, however, has not yet placed herself in the pathway of progress, in preparing the construction of a canal, which Secretary Hayes had declared would not be permitted. This was the first step toward the canal to the United States and to Panama. The letter of the United States declared its independence, and the United States government recognized its independence, to be a nation, and to be a nation. In justification of such procedure, the Republic of Colombia declared the canal then of affairs on the 1st of the moment. Panama had been in a state of rebellion for several months. The Islands was, according to the reports of that worthy nation, a perfect barren land, and its people were determined to make the most desperate resistance to the efforts of Colombia to subvert it. That Colombia was also prepared is shown by the fact that at the moment when independence was proclaimed, on the morning of November 3, she had a gunboat with between four and five hundred troops off Colon on the way to Panama. Secretary Hay, in his reply to General Reyes, thus defines the situation:—

"On the one hand stood the government of Colombia invoking in the name of the treaty of 1846 the aid of this government in its efforts to sup-

press the revolution, on the other hand stood the republic of Panama that had come into being in order that the great design of that treaty might not be forever frustrated but might be fulfilled. The Isthmus was threatened with desolation by another civil war, nor were the rights and interests of the United States alone at stake, the interests of the whole civilized world were involved. The republic of Panama stood for those interests, the government of Colombia opposed them. Compelled to choose between these two alternatives, the government of the United States, in nowise responsible for the situation that had arisen, did not hesitate. It recognized the independence of the republic of Panama, and upon its judgment and action in the emergency the Powers of the world have set the seal of their approval.

That civil war would have begun immediately on November 3 but for the intervention of the United States, is proved by the official report of Commander Hubbard, of the United States gunboat, "Nashville," who had been ordered by the American government to Colon to protect the neutrality of the Isthmus along the line of the Panama Railway. The commanding officers of the Colombian troops had asked for transportation over the railway to Panama for their troops and it had been granted, but it was prohibited by Commander Hubbard as a violation of the perfect neutrality of the line of transit which the United States is bound to maintain. If Commander Hubbard had not been on the spot, the troops would have gone to Panama and civil war would have been begun on November fourth. The Colombian troops, after failing to get transportation to Panama, sought to occupy Colon on November fourth in violation of an agreement between their commanding officers and Commander Hubbard. The latter, as soon as he learned of this intention, landed his full force of marine, only forty-two in number, for the avowed purpose of protecting the lives and property of American citizens if threatened, and by using this small, maintaining a cool and firm attitude at the presence of the Colombian troops when they entered the city, he prevented bloodshed and the beginning of civil war. President Roosevelt said on this point in his message of January 4, 1904:

"Instead of there having been too much provision by the American government for the maintenance of order and the protection of life and property on the Isthmus, the orders for the movement of American war-ships had been too long delayed, so long in fact, that there were but forty-two marines and sailors available to land and protect the lives of American men and women . . . It clearly appears that the fact that there was no bloodshed on the Isthmus was directly due,—and only due,—to the prompt and firm enforcement by the United States of its traditional policy."















tionists in Panama were right, the people of Panama were entitled to be free again, the Isthmus was theirs, and they were entitled to govern it, and it would have been a shameful thing for the government of the United States to return them again to servitude."

Was the act of recognition justified by the interests of civilization?"

President Roosevelt firmly believed it was. He said in his message of January 4, 1904: "I confidently maintain that the recognition of the republic of Panama was an act justified by the interests of collective civilization. If ever a government could be said to have received a mandate from civilization to effect an object the accomplishment of which was demanded in the interest of mankind, the United States holds that position with regard to the inter-oceanic canal." The civilized world very promptly confirmed this view of our position as the mandatory of civilization when through fifteen of its governments, including those of the leading nations, it recognized the independence of the new republic. Putting all other considerations aside, it is easy to discern that the great force which moved not only the United States government but the governments of the civilized world as a body forward so unanimously in this matter, was self-interest in three forms. First, the self-interest of Panama, which compelled the revolution as the only method of escape from destruction. Second, self-interest of the United States, which demands a canal for its commerce and the development of its resources. Third, self-interest of civilization throughout the world. On this point, that an isthmanian canal free to the commerce of the world is an inestimable boon to all mankind, there is no dissenting voice. By rejecting the new treaty, for the reasons given and in the manner followed, Colombia put herself athwart the pathway of the progress of the world, and the world united to crush her aside. Then, too, there was that sympathy with Panama which always goes forth to a people striving to rid themselves of oppression. As Vattel says: "When a people for good reasons take up arms against an oppressor, it is but an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of their liberties."

## OUR WORK AS A CIVILIZER

THE NEW REPUBLIC OF CUBA.

The body of the man was found dead, before it was turned over to its people for interment, and, such, like a romance, General Wood, in his admirable efforts to do good in the island,















collect any rents from the people occupying the lands, but under the Treaty of Paris they were lawful owners of the lands, were entitled to the use of them and the fruits of them, and if they were allowed to return and seek to enforce the rights of ownership the certain result would be riot and insurrection. What Governor Taft proposed was the purchase of the lands from them by the United States government and their sale in small holdings to the present tenants, on long and easy payments, the government to issue bonds in an amount sufficient for the purchase, and the proceeds of sales to go into a sinking fund for the redemption of the bonds. Congress authorized this proceeding, and in December, 1903, all the lands were bought for \$7,239,000, with the exception of about 10,000 acres that had been sold to a railway company. About three-fifths of the lands purchased are highly cultivated and thickly inhabited by thousands of tenants. In his final report as Civil Governor, previous to leaving the islands to assume the duties of Secretary of War at Washington, Mr. Taft said, in speaking of this transaction: "It is not thought that the income from the islands for several years will be enough to meet the actual outgo, but with a restoration of normal conditions speaking for myself alone I hope that the lands will sell for as much as we have paid for them. Other members of the Commission do not think so. It is to be noted, however, that the insular government has not entered upon the purchase of these lands with a view to a profitable investment, but that it is knowingly paying a considerable sum of money merely for the purpose of ridding the administration of the government in the islands of an issue dangerous to the peace and prosperity of the people of the islands.

"Following the policy which it was announced by the Vatican would be pursued, the bishops who were Spanish friars in all the dioceses of the islands have been allowed to resign and their places have been filled by American Catholic bishops. I cannot state with too much emphasis the satisfaction I feel in this change. It means, in my judgment, the beginning of a new era in the islands. It is to be expected that a large part of the people of the islands will continue to be communicants of the Roman Catholic Church, and it cannot but have a liberalizing effect upon them that their bishops shall be Americans with American ideas of a separation of church and state, and with the American respect for individual rights and individual liberties."

It may be well, in order to complete the record, to cite what President McKinley said to Judge Taft, when he selected him

to go to the Philippines. It is very like in tone and temper to what he said to General Wood. In his speech at a banquet which was given in his honor by his fellow citizens of Cincinnati, after his appointment, Judge Taft said: "The high and patriotic purpose of the President in the present juncture is to give to the people of the Philippine Islands the best civil government which he can provide, with the largest measure of self-government consistent with stability. He seeks only the welfare of the Filipino and the betterment of his condition." Speaking for him at the same time, Judge Taft said: "The problems seem certainly formidable enough. It will take patience, persistence, and tact to work them out. Doubtless we shall make mistakes which will deserve criticism, but if we maintain our purpose steadfast, to do nothing save for the good of the Filipino people, we hope, in spite of their formidable character, to surmount the obstacles and win success. If we can thus relieve a hitherto unfortunate and oppressed people from the evil of three centuries of misgovernment the end will be worth the struggle." In his formal instructions to the Taft Commission, President McKinley said: "A high and sacred obligation rests upon the government of the United States to give protection for property and life, civil and religious freedom, and wise, firm, and unselfish guidance in the path of peace and prosperity to all the people of the Philippine Islands. I charge this commission to labor for the full performance of this obligation, which concerns the honor and conscience of their country."

A few months later, in his letter accepting a renomination, President McKinley said: "It is our purpose to establish in the Philippines a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants, and to prepare them for self-government, and to give them self-government when they are ready for it, and as rapidly as they are ready for it." It is because these instructions have been carried forward in letter and in spirit that the work which we are doing in the Philippines is a great service to the civilization of the world.

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